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Both optimization techniques and expert systems technologies are popular ap-
proaches for developing tools to assist in complex problem-solving tasks. Because
of the underlying complexity of many such tasks, however, the models of the world
implicitly or explicitly embedded in such tools are often incomplete and the prob-
lem-solving methods fallible. The result can be "brittleness" in situations that
were not anticipated by the system designers. To deal with this weakness, it has
been suggested that "cooperative" rather than "automated" problem-solving sys-
tems be designed. Such cooperative systems are proposed to explicitly enhance the
collaboration of the person (or a group of people) and the computer system. This
study evaluates the impact of alternative design concepts on the performance of 30
airline pilots interacting with such a cooperative system designed to support en-
route flight planning. The results clearly demonstrate that different system design
concepts can strongly influence the cognitive processes and resultant perfor-
mances of users. Based on think-aloud protocols, cognitive models are proposed to
account for how features of the Computer system interacted with specific types of
scenarios to influence exploration and decision making by the pilots. The results
are then used to develop recommendations for guiding the design of cooperative
systems.
INTRODUCTION
Three alternative designs for a cooperative
problem-solving system (Robertson, ZacheD',
and Black, 1990) were empirically evaluated
in this study. All three designs provided sup-
port for the task of en-route planning for corn-
i Requests for reprints should be sent to Philip J. Smith,
Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory., 210 Baker
Systems, 1971 Neil Ave., Columbus, OH 43210.
mercial aviation flights. The designs differed
in terms of the timing and degree of assis-
tance provided by the computer. Our goals
were to gain a better understanding of how
people perform adaptive planning tasks, to
increase our understanding of how alterna-
tive system designs influence the cognitive
processes of users during such planning tasks,
and to develop recommendations to guide in
the design of advanced tools to support pilots
Reprinted with permission from Human Factors, VoI. 36, No. 1, Copyright 01994 by the Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.
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and dispatchers in their flight-planning activ-
ities. Of particular interest was the question:
How does the introduction of computer-
generated alternative plans change the explo-
ration of data and alternative routes and the
evaluation of these alternative routes by the
human planner?
CONTEXT
En-route flight planning (Cohen, Leddo,
and Tolcott, 1989; Johannsen and Rouse,
1983; Rudolf, Homoki, and Sexton, 1990; So-
rensen, Waters, and Patmore, 1983) involves
the modification of the aircraft route of flight
(flight plan) of an airborne aircraft in re-
sponse to problems with weather, air traffic,
medical emergencies, mechanical failures,
and so on. The flight crew, air traffic control-
lers, and airline company dispatchers all play
important roles in this planning process.
The flight plan stipulates at what altitude
and heading the aircraft will fly during vari-
ous phases of the flight and what route the
aircraft will take. The route determines the
weather and air traffic that will be encoun-
tered along the way, which affects speed,
• safety, fuel efficiency, passenger comfort, and
arrival time.
The planner, then, is concerned with get-
ting from a given origin to a given destination
in a timely and cost-effective fashion while
maintaining flight safety and passenger com-
fort. The planner must consider what routes
to take (these routes consist of navigational
fixes and jet routes, the so-called highways in
the sky that connect the navigational fixes),
at what altitudes to fly, what weather to
avoid (including winds, thunderstorms, freez-
ing rain, and turbulence), and the ever-
changing characteristics of the aircraft (for
example, the decrease in weight as fuel is con-
sumed).
The initial flight plan is rarely followed ex-
actly, because of unforeseen events en route.
Indeed, minor changes in flight plans are fre-
quently made, and major changes are com-
mon. These amendments to the original plan
result from the dynamic, unpredictable na-
ture of the "world" in which the plans are
executed. Weather patterns do not always de-
velop as predicted, resulting in unexpected
areas of turbulence, less favorable tailwinds,
or storms that must be avoided. Air traffic
congestion may delay takeoff or restrict the
aircraft to altitudes that are lower than
planned. Airport or runway closures can
cause major disruptions not only for one air-
craft but also for everyone planning to land at
that airport. Mechanical failures, medical
emergencies, or other critical problems may
force the aircraft to divert to an unplanned
airport.
In short, en-route flight planning is a large
and complex problem. Multiple goals must
be considered in a highly stochastic environ-
ment in which multiple plans must be coor-
dinated (Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979;
Hoc, 1988; Miller, Galanter, and Pribram,
1960; Sacerdoti, 1974; Schank and Abelson,
1977; Stefik, 1981; Suchman, 1987; Wilensky,
1983).
THE FLIGHT-PLANNING TEST BED:
DESIGN FEATURES
The Flight-Planning Test Bed was devel-
oped to test several cooperative planning sys-
tem design concepts (Coombs and Alty, 1987;
Lehner and Zirk, 1987; Shute and Smith,
1993; Thierauf, 1988). This design was devel-
oped following an extensive cognitive task
analysis (Smith, McCoy, Layton, and Bihari,
1992). The basic flight-planning system per-
forms a number of functions in response to
input from a human operator. The system al-
lows the user (either a pilot or a dispatcher)
to develop and display up to four flight plans
in conjunction with weather information and
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to obtain feedback in terms of such flight
parameters as fuel, time, and distance. The
weather information consists of both graphic
depictions and oral descriptions and can be
displayed at several altitudes. The displays
show the entire flight path, thus emphasizing
global solutions to problems. In addition, the
user can manipulate the display time to see
the relationship between the weather infor-
mation and the aircraft's position. The sys-
tem computes the optimal altitude profile to
minimize fuel consumption, arrival times at
navigational fixes, and fuel remaining at
those fixes, based on wind components. It
will also determine these flight parameters
given a user-selected altitude profile.
The basic system runs on a Macintosh Hfx
with two color monitors. The features and
functions on each monitor are discussed in
turn.
Left Monitor
The displays and controls on the left mon-
itor are shown in Figure 1. (In all of the fig-
ures that depict system displays, some of the
information loses salience as p_nted here in
black and white instead of color.)
The primary feature on the left monitor is a
map display. This display depicts the conti-
nental United States, the aircraft position,
and planned routes. Several pieces of infor-
mation can be overlaid on this map, includ-
ing weather information (overlays of compos-
ite cloud and composite radar charts, fronts,
and cloud cover, radar, and winds at specific
altitudes), navigational fixes, and jet routes
(see Figure 2).
All weather information is available for
two display times: the current time and a 1-h
forecast. When a forecast is displayed, the
aircraft is displayed in its predicted position
Figure 1. Left monitor display: original route (the middle route) and mutes explored by. sample subjects in
Case 1.
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Figure 2. High-altitude jet routes and navigational fixes.
(on each route) at the forecast time, as well as
in its current position. The user can also
zoom in on a region of the map, which re-
places the map of the continental United
States with a magnification of an area sur-
rounding a user-selected point.
Right Monitor
The right monitor displays and controls are
shown in Figure 3. It displays a flight log of a
route. This flight log is essentially a spread-
sheet that depicts each segment of the route
(i.e., all of the navigational fixes and jet
routes that make up the route), as well as in-
formation pertinent to those segments. The
flight log also graphically displays the
planned altitudes and the least-fuel-
consumption altitudes for that route. Finally,
the flight log displays weather information
that is pertinent to the route. For example,
turbulence information is displayed by de-
fault, but the operator can also select wind
information. The turbulence information that
is presented is a one-word summary of the
maximum turbulence on a given flight seg-
ment. The operator can get a more detailed
description of that information (available pi-
lot reports, or "pireps") by selecting (clicking
on) the one-word summary.
The other display on this monitor (at the
bottom of the screen) shows important flight
para.meters for all four alternative routes
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Figure 3. Right monitor display.
upon arrival at the destination. These param-
eters include time of arrival, time en route,
fuel remaining, and total distance. This dis-
play allows users to compare the "bottom
line" for each route.
Important Features
The design principles underlying the
Flight-Planning Test Bed as a cooperative
planning system are discussed in detail in
Smith et al. (1992). Five of the most signifi-
cant objectives, however, are as follows:
(1) To provide tools that allow cooperative plan-
ning at different levels of abstraction (in-
spired by the work of Hayes-Roth and Hayes-
Roth, 1979; Sacerdoti, 1974; Shute and
Smith, 1993; Suchman, 1987)
(2) To provide the human planner with data dis-
plays and representations to support plan
generation and evaluation at these different
levels of abstraction
(3) To provide interfaces to the available support
tools that allow the person to easily commu-
nicate desired trade-offs among goals
(4) To provide tools that help the person predict
the outcomes of various plans (Coombs and
Alty, 1987)
(5) To incorporate a graphical interface that al-
lows the person to view and explore alterna-
tive plans in the context of the relevant data
(i.e., weather displays)
In the next section we describe an empirical
study to assess some of these design consid-
erations.
METHODS
In the following study, the Flight-Planning
Test Bed was used to study the effects of
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different design features on cooperative prob-
lem-solving performance. Briefly, each of the
30 subjects (professional airline pilots) was
asked to use one of three alternative system
designs (10 subjects per condition). Each sub-
ject was trained in the use of that particular
system and given four cases to solve.
System Designs
Three different en-route flight-planning
support systems were designed that repre-
sented variations on the levels and timing of
support provided by the computer. These
variations on the system design represented
the independent variable studied in this ex-
periment.
Sketching-only system. The sketching-only
syste m allowed the human planner to sketch
proposed flight paths on a map display while
the computer filled in lower-level details
(such as fuel remaining, time of arrival, and
recommended altitudes) using an optimiza-
tion program. In this version the person was
responsible for proposing the alternate paths,
whereas the computer was responsible for
providing feedback on those solutions.
The sketching of routes was carried out by
displaying the jet routes and navigational
fixes and selecting (clicking on) each naviga-
tional fix through which the pilot wanted the
airplane to pass. This placed a slight restric-
tion on planning because vectoring can nor-
mally be requested to fly direct routes from
one point to another. However, this approach
allowed the planner to develop general solu-
tions with the understanding that these solu-
tions were not necessarily the exact routes
that would be flown.
Route constraints and sketching system. The
route constraints and sketching system re-
tained all of the capabilities of the sketching-
only svstem and added another capability:
Operators could specify higher-level con-
straints on the solution they desired and then
ask the computer to find the shortest route
that satisfied those constraints. The con-
straints that could be specified were maxi-
mum allowable turbulence, maximum allow-
able precipitation, and destination. (It is easy
to see how this interface design concept could
be extended to include other constraints,
such as earliest and latest desired arrival
times or number of passengers making their
coimections.)
Users could specify constraints on the solu-
tion they desired from the computer. The
computer would then recommend alterna-
tives. In addition, by means of the sketching
tool, users could explore specific routes them-
selves.
Automatic route constraints, route con-
straints, and sketching system. This version
took the computer's involvement one step
further: The computer automatically sug-
gested a deviation (based on default con-
straints of no turbulence, no precipitation,
and the originally planned destination) as
soon as it detected a problem with the origi-
nal route. This form of tool is akin to an au-
tonomous support system that automatically
suggests solutions to detected problems. This
system also made available the route con-
straints tool of the previous system and the
sketching tool of the previous two systems.
Underlying all three system designs is the
incorporation of tools to support asking
"what if" questions. That is, these tools help
the operator to ask such questions as, "What
type of solution does the computer suggest if
I use constraints of light turbulence and mod-
erate precipitation?" or "What happens to
my fuel remaining if I deviate north instead
of south?" We were interested in whether
people used the tools available to them, how
the available tools affected the cognitive pro-
cesses of the person using the system, and
how the available tools affected the solutions
that person chose.
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Subjects
Thirty male commercial airline pilots vol-
unteered to participate in this 3-h study. (Ap-
proximately half of that time was spent train-
ing the pilot on the system he would be
using.) Each pilot was randomly assigned to
one of the three alternative system designs.
The pilots represented eight major airlines,
and had an average of 9300 h of flying expe-
rience as commercial pilots and 1800 h of ex-
perience in military aircraft. In the results to
be presented, no apparent relationships were
found between the pilots' performances and
their levels or types of flying experience, or
with their levels of previous computer expe-
rience.
Cases: Characteristics and General Predictions
Following training on the use of the system,
each of the subjects was presented with four
en-route flight-planning cases in which he
was given some preliminary information
about the flight (e.g., origin, destination, time
of day) and was then told to "decide what the
aircraft should do." All of the subjects went
through the same four cases in the same or-
der. Whereas the subjects in the sketching-
only and route constraints and sketching con-
ditions started each case with only their
original route of flight, the subjects in the au-
tomatic route constraints, route constraints,
and sketching condition were also given an
alternate route suggested by the computer
based on the default constraints of finding a
route that was predicted to avoid all turbu-
lence and precipitation.
Cases 1 through 3 can be characterized as
having large solution spaces; that is, the num-
ber of plausible specific flight paths available
to accomplish a particular deviation (such as
going north of the storm) was very large. This
characteristic was expected to put the sub-
jects in the sketching-only version at a disad-
vantage in terms of finding fuel and time-
efficient alternative routes. It was also
expected to cause the sketching-only subjects
to develop a larger number of specific flight
plans for comparison.
All four cases could be described as having
a large data space, in the sense that the types
and amounts of data available in the different
displays were fairly large (though still small
by comparison with the types and amounts
currently being proposed for commercial sys-
tems at several of the major airlines). This
characteristic was expected to be most im-
portant in Case 2, in which a failure to note
the head winds to the south might lead to
selection of the less efficient southern devia-
tion by subjects sketching their own solu-
tions, and in Case 3, in which a failure to look
carefully at the location of the aircraft in re-
lation to current and forecast weather might
contribute to the acceptance of a poor plan.
Case 3 had the further property that the
limitations of the computer's knowledge led
to "brittle" performance, in which the com-
puter generated a poor suggestion for an al-
ternative route. This brittleness was attribut-
able to the fact that in searching for flight
plans, the computer treated forecasts as real-
ity. Uncertainty associated with the forecasts
was not considered in the computer's reason-
ing. This case was included to determine
whether subjects in the automatic version
would be more likely to be drawn into the
computer's "world," consequently failing to
use their own knowledge of the uncertainty
associated with such a forecast to reject the
computer's recommendation.
Finally, Case 4, which has a much smaller
solution space, is interesting because it intro-
duces a conflict between a common heuristic
used in selecting a flight amendment and the
fuel and time efficiency of the alternative
routes. Further details on these cases are in-
cluded in discussions of the results.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Case 1
The following scenario was read to subjects
prior to their working on this case:
It is summer and you're on a flight from Bat-
tleground (Portland) to Northbrook. Your
dispatcher gave you a southerly route in or-
der to avoid an occluded front. The front has
dropped to the south as well, however, and
has generated some thunderstorms. Time
out was 1700 Zulu and you are five minutes
into the flight. Decide what you think the
aircraft should do.
In all cases, for subjects in the treatment con-
dition in which the computer automatically
suggested a solution on loading the case, the
following two lines were added (prior to "De-
cide what you think..."):
The computer has suggested the orange
route as an alternative to the original plan
(the green route) based on constraints of no
turbulence and no precipitation. You may ac-
cept either of these plans or develop your own.
The original route (the middle route), the cur-
rent aircraft position, and the current com-
posite radar are shown in Figure 1. The radar
returns show a solid line of thunderstorms
with cell tops at 37 000 ft. (For this experi-
ment the pilots were told the aircraft's max-
imum altitude was 33 000 ft.) Furthermore,
the gap between the two cells was forecast to
close. Therefore, a deviation was obviously
required. The forecast storm movement was
to the east but was vet)' small. To provide a
concrete sense of the performances of the sub-
jects, the behaviors of three representative pi-
lots are first summarized. Then summary sta-
tistics are provided for the entire group.
Subject SI: sketching-only system. Subject
S 1 looked at the composite radar and fronts
(current and forecast) and concluded, "Going
to have to go north or south around it." This
pilot then sketched a northern deviation and
compared it with the original route, noting
that the deviation saved time and fuel and
avoided the turbulence. He then sketched a
southern deviation. While sketching the devi-
ation, he inferred that "it could move a little
further south [than forecast]," so he adjusted
the southern alternative for that contingency.
When the route was completed, he looked at
the computer's estimates for time and fuel
consumption and stated, "That one's quite a
bit longer," and decided to deviate north.
Subject C3: route constraints and sketching
system. Subject C3 looked at the composite
radar and concluded, "I can see right now
that what I want to do is come to the north."
After also looking at the clouds, he let the
computer find a deviation based on con-
straints of light turbulence and light precipi-
tation. The subject looked at the resultant
northern deviation suggested by the com-
puter and stated, "That looks like about what
I would have in mind." After checking the
data displayed on the national map to make
sure that the northern deviation had "no
problem with turbulence or precipitation,"
he compared it with the original route and
noted, "The total distance is actually a little
less. Fuel left is more, and we'll actually cut
time off our flight with this route." He then
decided to fly the computer-recommended
northern deviation.
Subject A9: automatic route constraints,
route constraints, and sketching system. The
computer automatically displayed to this pi-
lot a recommendation north of the storm. He
began his evaluation by comparing the esti-
mated time and fuel consumption for this
suggested route (to the north of the storm)
with the performance parameters for the
original route. He looked at the composite ra-
dar and turbulence on the national map and
concluded, "The alternate route certainly
looks better to me, and I would stick with
that."
Comparisons of sample subjects. Figure 1
shows the routes explored in detail by these
sample subjects. The subject in the sketching-
only version of the Flight-Planning Test Bed
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(S 1) explored the far northern route and the
southern route and elected to take the far
northern route. The subject who had access to
both the route constraints function and the
sketching function (C3) elected to use the
route constraints function. He accepted the
computer's suggested route (the northern
route that deviates tighter to the storm in Fig-
ure 1) without exploring any other alterna-
tives in detail. The subject who was automat-
ically shown the computer's suggestioil
(based on constraints of no turbulence and no
precipitation) showed evidence of evaluating
a southern deviation at an abstract level but
chose to accept the computer's suggestion to
the north without exploring any other alter-
natives in detail. (He discussed the tailwinds
along a southerly deviation but did not sketch
any such plan.)
The primary difference of interest (as illus-
trated by these three sample subjects) is the
fact that the pilot who had to sketch his own
solution selected a more conservative route,
staying farther north of the storm. This dif-
ference, which was found in many of the sub-
jects using the sketching-only version of the
system (to be summarized later) appears to
result from the tendency of those pilots who
sketched their own solution to more thor-
oughly consider the uncertainty associated
with the forecast. (Additional data pertinent
to this result are discussed next.)
Case 1 Summary Statistics
The following is a description of behaviors
for all of the subjects in the different treat-
ment conditions for Case 1.
Differences in final routes. In this case all 30
subjects chose to deviate to the north, which
is not surprising considering that this class of
solutions is more direct than the original
routing and is closer to the route that some-
one would fly if there were no weather prob-
lems. Nine of the ten subjects in the route
constraints and sketching version and nine of
the ten subjects in the automatic route con-
straints version selected the computer's sug-
gested northern deviation. Only two of the
ten subjects in the sketching-only version se-
lected that route. Six of the ten subjects in the
sketching-only version selected a more con-
servative northern deviation. Based on a chi-
square test, these differences are significant
at _t < 0.004.
Differences in exploration. Of the 10 subjects
using the sketching-only version, 4 explored
multiple classes of solutions in detail (i.e.,
they generated actual flight plans on the
screen). None of the 20 subjects using the
other two versions explored more than a sin-
gle class of solutions in detail. (In Case 1 ex-
ploring a solution north of the storm was de-
fined as one class of solution, and exploring a
solution south of the storm was a second
class.) This difference was significant at _t <
0.01.
Another measure of the amount of explora-
tion is the number of subjects who explored
multiple specific solutions in detail (as con-
trasted with multiple classes of solutions, as
summarized earlier). Again, the subjects in
the sketching-only version showed evidence
of more exploration (a < 0.014; 6 in 10 sub-
jects vs. 1 in 10 for both of the other two ver-
sions).
Differences in information search. The infor-
mation that the subjects looked at was also
analyzed on the basis of treatment condition.
The number of subjects in each condition
who looked at fronts, current or radar
weather (composite or at altitude), winds,
and jet routes is presented in Table 1.
As can be seen from this table, there are no
clear differences on Case 1 between groups in
information displayed, with the exception
that more of the sketching-only and route
constraints and sketching subjects looked at
the jet routes than did the automatic route
constraints, route constraints, and sketching
subjects. This latter fact is evidence that
87
COOPERATIVEPROBLEMSOLVING March 1994---103
TABLE1
Information Displayed by Subjects
Fronts Radar Winds Jet Routes
Case 1
Sketch 9 9 7 10
Constraints 8 10 5 9
Automatic 9 9 6 5
Case 2
Sketch 7 10 7 10
Constraints 7 10 3 9
Automatic 8 9. 7 8
Case 3
Sketch 10 10 5 10
Constraints 6 10 1 7
Automatic 8 10 5 9
Case 4
Sketch 8 10 6 10
Constraints 7 10 4 8
Automatic 6 10 4 9
many of the automatic route constraints sub-
jects evaluated the suggested route at an ab-
stract level (i.e., they didn't look at specific
choices of alternative jet routes to deviate
north of the storm). This one difference is sig-
nificant at ct < 0.013.
Case 1 Discussion
As described earlier, prior to the experi-
ment we made two predictions that are rele-
vant to these results. We predicted that, in
general, the pilots using the automatic ver-
sion might be less likely than the sketching-
only subjects to explore as many alternatives
in detail and less likel3; than the sketching-
only subjects to consider the uncertainty
associated with weather forecasts, conse-
quently accepting the computer's recommen-
dation without adequate evaluation. The re-
sults for Case 1 are consistent with these
general predictions. They indicate, for exam-
ple, that the sketching-only subjects explored
more alternatives. Furthermore, the concur-
rent oral reports indicate that the sketching-
only subjects who deviated farther north (see
Figure 1) were indeed considering the uncer-
tainty associated with the forecast, making
statements such as, "If the system moved fur-
ther north and the thunderstorms started to
pop up" and "Let's take a look at how much
further north we could go."
One way to explain these effects is to say
that the pilots in the automatic conditions
were overreliant or overtrusting of the sys-
tem, failing to critically evaluate the situa-
tion and the computer-suggested plan. These
are rather shallow labels, however, and don't
provide much insight into the influence of the
system's design on the user's cognitive pro-
cesses.
The clearest example of such an effect oc-
cun-ed in Case I at the point at which the
subjects had to decide whether to stay north
of the storm, from DPR to RWF, or to begin
tm-ning south toward the destination, from
DPR to FSD (see Figure 4). Because the sys-
tem design induced the sketching-only sub-
jects to view the display shown in this figure
if they wanted to complete a reasonable
northern deviation, it can be concluded that
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Figure 4. Fuel-efficient, computer-suggested route versus more conservative north-
ern deviations.
(a) the subjects observed that the route from
DPR to FSD cut close to the forecast storm
activity, (b) this observation influenced them
to consider the possibility that the forecast
might be wrong and that the storm might
move further north or east than predicted,
and (c) they consequently chose the more con-
servative path from DPR to RWF.
This observation contrasts with the behav-
iors of all but two of the subjects in the two
route constraints function conditions. These
18 subjects viewed the computer's recom-
mended solution at the national map level
(often without even displaying the jet routes)
and simply concluded that it looked okay
without closely focusing on the choices at
DPR. For example, while looking at the na-
tional map, Subject C4 stated:
See if I can get the computer to find a route.
[He used the route constraints function with
the constraints of no turbulence and no pre-
cipitation, and the computer suggested a
northerly route.] With a northerly deviation,
I can get by with the constraints I placed on
it. Now I want to check and make sure. [He
observed the destination parameters for _-
timated time and fuel consumption.] This
gives me, actually, a shorter flight plan and
plenty of fuel at arrival. So I would go ahead
and select that route at that point.
Unlike the sketching-only subject described
earlier, there is no evidence that Subject C4
considered the uncertainty associated with
the storm or that he considered a more con-
servative northerly deviation.
In short, rather than "explaining" the ef-
fects of the automatic display of suggestions
with a label such as overreliance, it is more
informative to conclude the following:
(1) The form of planning required bv the sketch-
ing-only version forced those pilots to gener-
ate plans one leg at a time.
(2) The goal of generating the leg leaving DPR
caused the pilots to zoom in on the display
shown in Figure 4.
(3) Viewing this display in the context of the goal
of selecting the next leg of the flight induced
the pilots to consider the uncertainty associ-
ated with the storm.
Thus the design of the system interacted with
specific characteristics of the scenario to in-
fluence the pilots' cognitive processes.
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Incomplete predictions. Earlier we de-
scribed the support of these results from Case
1 for two general predictions that we made.
Note that although we made general predic-
tions regarding the possible influence of au-
tomatic suggestions on a planner's consider-
ation of the uncertainty associated with a
forecast, we did not recognize ahead of time
that these predictions applied to the scenario
presented in Case 1. (We did not predict that
the sketching-only subjects would tend to se-
lect a more conservative northerly deviation
in this scenario.) As designers, we uninten-
tionally mimicked the behavior of the sub-
jects in the automatic version and did not ad-
equately consider the potential effects of
uncertainty in the weather on the subjects in
the sketching-only version.
This suggests that it is not sufficient as part
of the design process to make general predic-
tions about the effects of alternative designs.
To adequately evaluate design alternatives
analytically, it is necessary to map out de-
tailed scenario-specific predictions of alter-
native internal cognitive activities and se-
quences of behaviors that users might exhibit.
(This implies that it is also necesshry to de-
velop a comprehensive set of scenarios.) Fur-
thermore, these results illustrate the value of
empirical evaluations to detect designer over-
sights.
Initial evaluation of system designs. In Case
1 we can't criticize the computer's suggested
route or either of the more conservative
northerly routes selected by the pilots in the
sketching-only version--all of them are rea-
sonable. We might, however, speculate that
in other circumstances, the cognitive activities
induced by the sketching-only version (if
these cognitive processes persist in other sce-
narios) could lead to more exploration and
deeper consideration of the implications of
uncertainty in the forecast, leading to the se-
lection of a superior route. (Data relevant to
this hypothesis will be presented in Case 3.)
If this behavior persists in other scenarios,
it might be construed as an advantage in the
design of the sketching-only system. There
was also evidence of behaviors in Case 1,
however, in which the sketching-only version
put some of the subjects at a disadvantage. In
particular, two of these subjects selected a
plan that deviated from the original plan at
DBS, a second possible deviation point,
rather than MYL, the earliest possible devia-
tion point (see Figure 4). This second devia-
tion point is less preferable in terms of fuel
consumption.
In abstract terms, then, we again see im-
portant effects induced by the system de-
signs. The subjects in the route constraints
and sketching and the automatic route con-
straints conditions let the computer pick a
fuel-efficient point for deviation from the
original plan. Because of the large solution
space, however, the sketching-only subjects
were (as predicted) faced with a reasonably
difficult task when identifying the best devi-
ation point.
Overview. Case 1 provides clear evidence
that the design of the system has strong ef-
fects on pilots' performances. More impor-
tant, it provides insights into the ways in
which design features interact with the char-
acteristics of this task (scenario) to influence
the user's cognitive processes.
The data from Case 1 indicate that in some
ways, use of the computer to produce sug-
gested plans degrades the pilot's role in eval-
uating plans, whereas in other ways (i.e.,
finding fuel-efficient solutions) it enhances
performance. The following cases provide
further data to assess this apparent trade-off
between these different design concepts.
Case 2
Case 2 was designed so that there were two
initially plausible directions for deviating
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(north or south of a storm). The scenario con-
sisted of the following:
It's summer and you are eight minutes into a
flight from Oakland to Joliet. You got off the
ground at 1600 Zulu. You notice that there is
a solid line of convective thunderstorms di-
rectly in your path. Decide what you think
the aircraft should do. [Figure 5 shows the
weather for this case.]
Subject $6: sketching-only system. Prior to
the experiment we hypothesized that manv of
the subjects using the sketching-only version
would explore and select a southern devia-
tion in light of the fact that the southern
thunderstorm cell appears to be smaller than
the northern cell. Because of tailwinds to the
north, and headwinds to the south, a north-
ern deviation was clearly preferable in terms
of fuel consumption and time of arrival.
After looking at the current and forecast
fronts and composite radar (see Figure 5), this
subject sketched a southern deviation, com-
pared it with the original route, and checked
it for turbulence. Without checking the winds
or sketching other alternatives, he selected
this deviation.
Subject C3: route constraints and sketching
system. Subject C3 looked at the current and
forecast composite radar and concluded that
he could deviate either to the north or to the
south. He decided to let the computer find a
deviation based on constraints of light turbu-
lence and light precipitation. The computer
suggested the northern deviation shown in
Figure 5, and the subject checked it for tur-
bulence. After finding no turbulence along
the deviation, he checked it for clearance
from the thunderstorms. The subject decided
that the distance between the route and the
thunderstorms was adequate. He then de-
cided to fly the computer-suggested northern
Figure 5. Routes explored by sample subjects in Case 2 (plotted on a map showing the forecast weather).
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route but stated that he would keep an eye on
the thunderstorms.
Subject A9: automatic route constraints, route
constraints, and sketching system. This subject
first looked at the composite radar for the
current weather map. He compared the time
and fuel consumption for the two routes (the
original route and the automatically sug-
gested northern route) and noted their differ-
ences. Finally, he gathered some more
weather information, including winds, and
decided to accept the computer-suggested
northern route.
Case 2 Summary Statistics
Whereas 9 of the 10 route constraints and
10 of the 10 automatic subjects decided to
deviate north of the original route, 4 of the 10
sketching-only subjects deviated to the south.
Based on a chi-square test, this difference was
significant at - < 0.044. Nevertheless, the
sketching-only subjects were not the only
ones to explore both northern and southern
deviations in detail: 8 of 10 sketching-only, 5
of 10 route constraints, and 4 of 10 automatic
subjects explored both northern and southern
deviations in detail.
As in Case 1, the information that the sub-
jects looked at was also analyzed on the basis
of treatment condition (see Table 1).
Case 2 Discussion
As stated earlier, one of our hypotheses
was that because of the large number of
possible solutions to explore, subjects in the
sketching-only version would be less likely to
find the most fuel-efficient route that also
avoided the bad weather. This effect was
clearly shown in Case 2, in which 40% of the
sketching-only subjects selected a southern
deviation. The various southern deviations
selected used about 3% more fuel and took
about 8 min longer than did the northern de-
viation.
This difficulty in identifying the most fuel-
efficient deviation was in part attributable to
a failure to access all of the data in evaluat-
ing solutions. Three of the subjects in the
sketching-only version failed to look at the
map display for winds and consequently did
not realize the southern deviation had signif-
icant headwinds. Thus, because of the large
solution space and the large data space, sub-
jects in the sketching-only version had more
difficulty in generating the most efficient
route and in evaluating the less satisfactory
southern route.
Case 3
Case 3 was designed to present the pilots
with a difficult planning problem and to put
the various system designs to a demanding
test. Unlike the previous cases, the thunder-
storms in Case 3 were not localized, and their
tops were not all at the same altitude. Like
Case 2, there were two likely directions for
deviating, but in this case neither was with-
out potential problems. In particular, a devi-
ation that avoided storms at the beginning of
the route had to pass through more severe
storms later. Finally, flight safety was a big-
ger concern in this case than in the previous
cases.
The following scenario was read to the sub-
jects prior to their working on the case:
It's summer and you're on a flight from
Cheyenne to San Antonio. You got off the
ground at 1900 Zulu and are now two min-
utes into the flight. Decide what you think
the aircraft should do.
The original route, the current aircraft po-
sition, and the current composite radar are
shown in Figure 6. The current radar shows a
number of thunderstorm cells with tops rang-
ing from 28 000 to 43 000 ft, but the aircraft's
maximum altitude was 33 000 ft. One of the
cells directly on the flight path had a top of'
43 000 ft. The forecast radar showed that the
cells were predicted to move north and
slightly east.
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280
Figure 6. Original route (the middle route) and suggested alternative routes for Case 3.
In summary, Case 3 presented subjects
with a complex planning problem. The
weather was dispersed over a large area and
was changing somewhat unpredictably. This
scenario required that the pilots anticipate
various possible outcomes and plan accord-
ingly. The routes suggested by the computer
in the route constraints and sketching and au-
tomatic route constraints, route constraints,
and sketching conditions are shown in Figure
6. The computer suggested two routes, de-
pending on the constraints placed on it. Con-
straints of no turbulence and no precipitation
caused the computer to suggest the eastern
route. Constraints that allowed light turbu-
lence and precipitation caused the computer
to suggest the western route. In the automatic
route constraints, route constraints, and
sketching condition, the route that the com-
puter automatically suggested to the subjects
was the eastern route. These subjects had to
modify the constraints on the computer or
sketch their own route in order to come up
with their own western route.
The eastern route passed between two
large, severe thunderstorm cells. Summer
thunderstorms in Texas are notorious for
their volatility, and it was possible that the
two cells on either side of the eastern route
would grow and build together. Furthermore,
the eastern route passed extremely close to a
forecast intense cell location.
Prior to the experiment we hypothesized
that many of the subjects would have diffi-
culty searching the space of possible solu-
tions and that some of the subjects in the au-
tomatic route constraints condition would
select the eastern deviation because it was
the one initially recommended by the com-
puter, in spite of the fact that it is a question-
able choice in both relative and absolute
terms. (This case was deliberately selected
because the automatic suggestion provided
by the computer was poor--poor because the
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computer treated the forecasts as reality,
rather than reasoning about the uncertainty
associated with the forecasts. The weather
pattern is, however, realistic. It is based on
real weather data provided by the National
Center for Atmospheric Research.)
S,_bject SI : sketching-only system. This sub-
ject first indicated that he would have pre-
ferred waiting for the weather to clear. Be-
cause the aircraft was already en route,
however, he considered trying to fly above
the weather. He rejected that possibility on
seeing the cell tops rising up to 43 000 ft. The
subject then spent some time assessing the
weather before coming up with two options
for dealing with it. First he decided to try go-
ing all the way around the back side of the
weather (a far western deviation), but then
decided against that option. Deciding to try
another western deviation, Subject $1 first
tried to deviate from TBE to TCC in order to
avoid the cells that lay on the jet route from
PUB to TCC (see Figure 7). Realizing that was
not possible, the subject tried to avoid the
worst of the forecast cells by deviating from
PUB to LVS and then back to TCC. After com-
pleting the deviation to SAT, the subject com-
pared it with the original route and deter-
mined that there was not much fuel
remaining.
Subject $1 then looked briefly at a far east-
ern deviation but instead decided to try a far
western deviation around the back of the
storm again. After completing the deviation
Figure 7. Routes considered by. the sketching-only subjects in Case 3.
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and checking it for turbulence, the subject de-
cided that he would continue trying options
but that he would start flying a far western
deviation. He noticed that this route had in-
creased fuel burn, but the subject also noted
that Albuquerque, El Paso, and Dallas were
potential alternative destinations. The sub-
ject then raised the descent profile from INK
to JNC in an effort to avoid the moderate tur-
bulence and to conserve fuel. After comparing
the altered profile with the original altitude
profile for the deviation, he decided (based on
fuel consumption) that he would stick with
the original altitude profile.
Finally, Subject $I sketched another west-
ern deviation, but began from AMA rather
than PUB. Once again, it appeared as though
the subject was trying to avoid the forecast
thunderstorm cells south of PUB. Thinking
that this route might have saved some fuel, he
compared it with the others and noted that
the difference was not that large. He then re-
iterated his choice of a far western route
(much farther west than the western route
shown in Figure 6).
Subject $6: sketching-only system. Subject
$6 spent a fair amount of time assessing the
weather before deciding to deviate east from
AMA to SPS to DFW (see Figure 7). Like Sub-
ject $1, he planned his deviations using fore-
cast weather. In particular, he had zoomed
the display around the Denver area when he
decided to deviate east. This view clearly
showed some moderate thunderstorm cells
just south of Puebltr--these likely contributed
to his decision to go east. That is, he elimi-
nated possible western deviations from con-
sideration based on a localized criterion or
aspect (Tversky, 1972).
Note that this decision was based on fore-
cast conditions, not current conditions; cur-
rent weather indicated no cells south of
Pueblo. This initial decision led the subject to
generate and select the eastern route shown
in Figure 6, which passed between the two
close, severe thunderstorms near SPS. He did
not go back and reconsider his choice of de-
viation directions to find a more suitable op-
tion but announced his intention to fly the
eastern deviation. In the debriefing, the sub-
ject indicated that the western deviation was
clearly preferable (in spite of his choice of the
eastern deviation when actually generating
his own plan).
Subject C8: route constraints and sketching
system. Subject C8 briefly looked at weather
information before using the route con-
straints function with no turbulence and no
precipitation. The computer suggested an
eastern deviation based on those constraints.
After checking the route for turbulence and
then further examining the weather, the sub-
ject decided to sketch a western deviation be-
ginning with a leg from PUB to TCC (see Fig-
ure 7). The subject completed the western
deviation (shown in Figure 6) and checked it
for turbulence. He then raised the altitude of
the leg from INK to JCT (Figure 7) to avoid
the moderate turbulence there. Next, the sub-
ject tried to find out what was causing the
turbulence in the first place. He looked at the
destination parameters and indicated that he
preferred the western route, then examined
the eastern deviation for turbulence and re-
turned to looking at the weather.
The subject next modified the western de-
viation so that it went from PUB to LVS be-
fore returning to TCC (see Figure 7). At this
point he spent considerable time examining
the two western deviations he had sketched
and the weather trends. He finally decided to
fly the western deviation that he had
sketched first, with the provision that it
might have to be modified later depending on
how the weather actually developed.
Subject A9: automatic route constraints,
route constraints, and sketching system. Sub-
ject A9 started by comparing the suggested
eastern deviation with the original route (be-
fore even looking at weather information).
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After noting the differences between the
routes in terms of destination parameters and
turbulence, he began comparing the routes
on the basis of weather. He then sketched a
western deviation beginning at AMA and go-
ing to ROW (see Figure 7). He checked the
turbulence forecast for this western route and
rejected that route because it passed through
an area where moderate turbulence was pre-
dicted up to 29 000 ft for the last third of the
flight. He subsequently decided to take the
eastern deviation recommended by the com-
puter. In the debriefing he indicated that he
would prefer the western deviation over the
plan he had selected.
Case 3 Summary Statistics
Table 2 contrasts subjects in terms of
whether they selected the computer-suggested
eastern route or another route. In addition, as
in Case 2, the routes chosen by the sketching-
only subjects were much more varied than
the ones chosen by the subjects in the other
two treatment conditions.
Differences in detailed exploration. Case 3
stands in contrast to the previous two cases,
in that the sketching-only subjects did not ex-
plore multiple classes of solutions in detail
(actually generating specific flight plans)
more often than did the subjects in the other
two groups. Instead, it was the automatic
route constraints, route constraints, and
sketching group that explored multiple
classes of solutions in detail more often than
did the subjects in the other two groups, _t <
TABLE 2
Final Route Choices for Case 3
Computer-Suggested
Eastern Route Other
Sketch 1 9
Constraints 3 7
Automatic 4 6
0.022 (5 of 10 in the sketching only, 3 of 10 in
the route constraints, and 9 of 10 in the auto-
matic condition explored multiple classes of
solutions in detail).
Differences in information search. The num-
ber of subjects in each condition who looked
at fl-onts, radar weather, and jet routes is pre-
sented in Table 1. There are no clear, statis-
tically significant differences between groups
in information searched. The trend, however,
seems to be that the route constraints and
sketching subjects looked at less information
than the sketching-only and automatic sub-
jects.
Case 3 Discussion
Once again, the data indicate that the sys-
tem design strongly influences the explora-
tion and plan selection processes of the sub-
jects.
Search difficulties. Some of the same chal-
lenges in searching the space of possible so-
lutions that occurred in Case 2 recurred in
Case 3 for subjects in the sketching-only con-
dition. For example, Subject $10 made six at-
tempts at sketching routes (some were com-
pleted, some were aborted) before sketching
the route that he finally chose. Similarly,
Subject $7 made six attempts at sketching
routes before choosing one of them. This
difficulty experienced by the sketching-only
subjects in generating effective plans was
strikingly illustrated by one pilot who de-
veloped and chose a deviation all the way
east around the entire storm, using up 24%
more fuel than the more reasonable western
deviation.
Poor search strategies. Subject $6, described
in detail earlier, illustrates a fascinating ex-
ample of how particular strategies can lead to
poor solutions. His strategy can be character-
ized as an elimination-by-aspects approach
(Tversky, 1972), in which the aspects are local
decisions about which waypoint to go to next.
In particular, he began by saying, "Where
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should I go next, from PUB to TCC or from
PUB to AMA?" He selected AMA because it
was farther from the storm west of TCC. He
then considered, "Should I go from AMA to
SPS or to ABI or to TCC?" (See Figure 7.) He
selected SPS. Because of these localized deci-
sions, he never even considered whether this
eastern deviation was to be preferred globally
to the western route.
Similarly, several subjects in the automatic
version exhibited ineffective strategies. Spe-
cifically, they first noted the computer's au-
tomatic suggestion of the eastern deviation
(see Figure 6). They subsequently generated
the western deviation (either by sketching it
or by changing the constraints and having the
computer generate it). They then viewed the
display of predicted turbulence and rejected
the western deviation based on the presence
of moderate turbulence at some altitudes in
the last third of the flight. They did not note
any other plausible alternatives, so they ac-
cepted the computer's initially suggested (but
very. poor) eastern route.
Two underlying processes appear to be con-
tributing to this poor performance. First,
these subjects are using a single aspect or cri-
terion to reject a plan, rather than evaluating
the plan globally in comparison with alterna-
tives. Second, they appeared to accept the
computer's poor initial suggestion by default
after they rejected the western deviation. In
particular, like the pilots in the automatic
version in Case 1, they did not show evidence
of considering the uncertainty associated
with the weather around the eastern deviation.
Disorientation. A final interesting behavior
was the failure of some pilots to view the ap-
propriate data when evaluating an alterna-
tive. These pilots were looking at the forecast
weather while making decisions about the
initial segment of the flight. They should have
looked at the original weather display to
guide decisions that early in the flight. (They
appeared to be unaware of which weather
display--forecast or current weather--they
were looking at.)
Summary. A number of subjects in all three
conditions exhibited poor performance in
Case 3. Although more subjectsappeared to
be biased toward a poor solution when it was
suggested by the computer, this bias cannot
be explained simply by overreliance in the
sense of blindly accepting the computer's rec-
ommendations. These subjects showed clear
evidence of generating and evaluating alter-
natives. Thus much deeper explanations had
to be developed to account for their accep-
tance of the computer's poor suggestion. In
addition, forcing the pilots to be more in-
volved by making them sketch their own so-
lutions resulted in the selection of fewer poor
plans. Nevertheless, because of the use of an
elimination-by-aspects strategy by one sub-
ject, he generated and selected the poor east-
ern deviation without any suggestions from
the computer.
Case 4
Case 4 presented subjects with a situation
in which the shortest and most fuel-efficient
deviation, north, required the pilots to violate
one of their standard heuristics (fly upwind of
thunderstorms). The storm in this case could
also be topped though that would have put
the aircraft in turbulence above the storm.
Furthermore, there was some risk of the
storm growing quickly. As in the previous
two cases, there were two likely directions for
deviating; in this case those directions were
north and south of the storm.
The following scenario was read to the sub-
jects prior to their working on the case:
You are on a flight from Albuquerque to New
Orleans. You got off the ground at 1400 Zulu.
You are now 19 minutes into the flight and
have noticed a thunderstorm cell outside of
Dallas. Decide what you think the aircraft
should do.
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Theoriginal route, the current aircraft po-
sition, and the current composite radar are
shown in Figure 8 along with the likely devi-
ations north and south of the storm. The fore-
cast weather showed the storm moving
slowly to the northeast.
Subject SI : sketching-only system. Subject
$1 began by looking at weather information
and mav have considered flying over the top
of the weather; he wondered aloud how high
the cell went and noted that it went up to
28 000 ft and that the aircraft was planned to
fly at 33 000 ft. On noticing moderate turbu-
lence at 33 000 ft, however, the subject de-
cided to tr3" a southern route. After sketching
a southern deviation, he checked it for turbu-
lence and compared it with the original
route. The subject then reviewed the weather
and the original route and sketched a route to
the north. After checking the route for turbu-
lence, he decided that either route would
work. Because the storm was isolated, he de-
cided to take the route that consumed the
least fuel, which was the northern route (even
though he noted that the storm was moving
north).
Subject C8: route constraints and sketching
system. Subject C8 started by checking the
weather and then decided to use the route
constraints function to find a new route based
on constraints of no turbulence and no pre-
cipitation. The computer suggested a north-
ern deviation, which the subject checked for
turbulence and compared with the original
route. Subject C8 then decided to sketch a
southern deviation to see if it was any better.
In comparing the northern and southern
routes, he noted the trade-off between the
two: The northern route took less time, but
the storm was slowly moving in that direc-
tion. He rechecked the weather and the tur-
bulence on the southern route and stated that
it did not matter which one he chose.
He was continuing to look at the weather
and the southern route when he noticed the
possibility of flying above the weather. This
prompted him to relax his constraints to light
turbulence and light precipitation and try the
route constraints function again. The com-
puter again suggested the northern route. The
subject then went through a process of rea-
soning about the uncertainty of the forecast,
the position of the aircraft relative to the
weather, and the costs of avoiding all of the
Figure 8. Current composite radar for Case 4.
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uncertainty. This resulted in his choosing the
southern deviation so that he would be as-
sured of avoiding the weather.
Subject A 7 : automatic route constraints, route
constraints, and sketching system. Subject A7
first compared the destination parameters of
the original route and the computer-suggested
northern deviation. He then checked the de-
viation for turbulence and continued investi-
gating the weather. Subject A7 decided to _ry
a southern deviation and compared the des-
tination parameters of that route with those
of the other routes. After gathering more
weather information, this pilot diverted to
the south.
Case 4 Summary Statistics
The following data are for all 30 subjects.
Differences in final routes. For the most
part, there were three reasonably likely route
alternatives: north of the original route,
south of the original route, and the original
route (at a higher altitude). Subjects were
grouped on the basis of choosing a route sim-
ilar to the computer-suggested northern devi-
ation, a southern deviation, or the original
route. This analysis is presented in Table 3. In
terms of fuel consumption and time of ar-
rival, the northern deviation is slightly better
than the southern one: A southern deviation
consumes 368 lb (167 kg) more fuel (about 2%
of the fuel consumed by the northern devia-
tion) and takes an additional 3 min. However,
isolated thunderstorms in Texas are some-
times called super cells because of their vola-
tility and unpredictability. A third of the
TABLE 3
Final Route Choices for Case 4
North South Original
Sketch 5 4 1
Constraints 5 4 1
Automatic 7 2 1
subjects believed the trade-off in time and
fuel was worth the added security of a south-
ern deviation (because the storm was moving
northeast).
Differences in detailed exploration. Case 4 is
similar to Case 3 in that the sketching-only
subjects show a trend not to explore multiple
classes of solutions in detail as often as do
subjects in the other two groups. This trend is
only marginally significant, _t < 0.142 (6 of 10
sketching-only, 5 of 10 route constraints, and
9 of 10 automatic subjects explored multiple
classes of solutions in detail).
Differences in information search. The num-
ber of subjects in each condition who looked
at fronts, radar weather winds, and jet routes
is presented in Table 1. There were no clear
differences in the groups.
Case 4 Discussion
Unlike the previous cases, the data do not
provide strong evidence that the system de-
sign strongly influenced the exploration and
plan selection processes of the subjects,
though there is a trend showing that the au-
tomatic route constraints subjects chose the
computer's suggested route more often. This
may be attributable to the much smaller so-
lution space present in Case 4.
Individual differences. Although the data
again suggest a possible (nonsignificant) bi-
asing effect attributable to the computer's au-
tomatic suggestion, the primary result of in-
terest is the evidence that pilots differ in their
evaluations of alternatives. Some clearly pre-
ferred deviating north to save time and fuel.
Others preferred the more conservative
southern deviation to decrease the likelihood
of encountering the storm. (The available
data are not informative regarding the causes
of such differences. Preference differences
could result from different mental models of
the weather or air traffic, differences in util-
ity functions, or differences in training or fly-
ing experiences, among others.)
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CONCLUSION
Our results show that, at least for the fore-
seeable future, it will be infeasible to fully
automate tasks such as en-route flight plan-
ning given the current state of technology.
Feasible methods for adequately dealing with
reasoning about such complex, uncertain
events and for considering the trade-offs
among goals such as safety, cost, and passen-
ger comfort simply do not exist at present.
However, current and developing technol-
ogies seem to offer interesting opportunities
for enhancing flight planning activities, such
as the following:
(1) Designing better interfaces to provide more
perspicuous displays of such data and infor-
mation and to incorporate graphical inter-
faces that allow direct manipulation of routes
to explore alternatives
(2) Providing access to more complete and accu-
rate information on weather, air traffic, and
airport conditions in a timely fashion
(3) Using optimization and expert systems tech-
nologies to assist users in generating and eval-
uating alternative plans and to provide intel-
ligent alerting functions
(4) Using the computer to enhance communica-
tion and cooperation among the various peo-
ple concerned with flight planning (dispatch-
ers, flight crews, air traffic control, etc.)
In our research we have encountered evi-
dence to support all four points. The present
study is particularly important in raising is-
sues regarding the first and third areas, how-
ever. The results clearly demonstrate the crit-
ical need to address the question: How can
advanced technologies be applied to develop
cooperative planning systems that effectively
support the activities of users?
In spite of the emphasis in this paper on
errors induced by the Flight-Planning Test
Bed, overall, the design features of all three
versions supported successful efforts. In
Cases 1, 2, and 4, all of the plans selected us-
ing all three versions of the system were ac-
ceptable, though some were less efficient in
terms of fuel consumption and flight time.
The overall efficacy of the design of the
Flight-Planning Test Bed as a cooperative
system was further supported by the reac-
tions of the pilots:
"I think it's great. It gives you another piece
of information to consider. It's like delegat-
ing responsibility."
"It would be great if you could sit down with
your dispatcher and do this sort of thing be-
fore a flight."
"I like it. Being able to zoom in on the route
and look at the weather and the projections
is nice. It's pretty easy to use. It's pretty
straightforward. It's got everything you
need."
"I wish we had something like this now, es-
pecially in operations. You'd have to kill
guys to get them off of it."
"I'm pretty impressed by this. If you could
get the lunch menu on here too, you'd have it
made!"
Nevertheless, as Case 3 most dramatically
demonstrated, certain design features can in-
duce unacceptable performances.
There will no doubt be a strong temptation
to let technology drive the development of fu-
ture flight-planning systems because the po-
tential value of the available computer and
telecommunications technologies seems so
apparent. This study, however, provides
strong evidence that the design of the com-
puter support system can clearly influence
the exploration and evaluation of alternative
system plans by users. The data demon-
strated that even when alternative designs
provide access to the same data, some designs
can exert powerful and undesirable effects on
the problem-solving processes of the user and
on the final product of these processes (the
selected flight amendment).
The following summarizes the various un-
desirable effects observed in this study and
discusses recommendations for system de-
signs and future research.
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Large Data Spaces
In the near future it will be possible to pro-
vide flight planners with access to a rich set
of data relevant to the planning process. As
this study illustrated, however, more is not
necessarily better. Even with the limited
sources of data available to users of the
Flight-Planning Test Bed, we saw evidence of
disorientation and failure to attend to impor-
tant data. Such effects are likely to increase
as we provide access to even more data dis-
plays.
Some pilots, for instance, failed to recog-
nize that they were looking only at the fore-
cast weather when planning early segments
of the flight (in situations in which current
weather displays were clearly relevant). The
result for one subject (in the sketching-only
version) in Case 3 was to completely overlook
the best solution and to accept a poor flight
plan.
In addition to such disorientation, some pi-
lots failed even to look at important data such
as the winds. This was a major contributing
factor leading to the selection of the less de-
sirable southern deviation in Case 2 by sev-
eral sketching-only subjects.
Several design principles are suggested by
such data:
(1) When designing the computer system, select
the data to display judiciously. Providing ac-
cess to more kinds of data, even though in
principle they may be useful, does not ensure
that they will be used effectively at the fight
time.
(2) Develop good representations to make the im-
plications of important data and relation-
ships salient to the user. (One interesting ex-
ample of a problem was discovered with
current displays of wind information: A num-
ber of pilots did not know how to interpret
wind charts regarding the strength or direc-
tion of the winds.)
(3) Consider designing integrated data displays
to communicate information pertinent to a
common goal for which those types of data
are pertinent. The Flight-Planning Test Bed
demonstrates the integration of weather data
with displays of alternative flight paths. Dis-
plays that integrate data on precipitation and
turbulence at different altitudes would simi-
larly be useful (but not trivial to design).
(4) Provide clear feedback about the state of the
display (such as whether the displayed data
represent current or forecast weather). It is
not enough to present such data on the state
of the display. It must be highly salient.
(5) Consider incorporating intelligent alerting
functions to ensure that critical data (or the
implications of these data) are not over-
looked.
Large Solution Spaces
Because of the large number of possible
flight paths, the subjects in the sketching-
only version sometimes had difficulty finding
a good alternative. In circumstances in which
time is critical, such difficulties could also
use up valuable time and attention.
This problem suggests the potential value
of tools (based on optimization or expert sys-
tem technologies) to help search for good so-
lutions. Indeed, without such tools, the sub-
jects frequently found solutions that used up
significantly more flight time and fuel and
were no better in terms of other criteria. One
subject, for instance, selected a plan in Case 3
that used up 24% more fuel.
A counterargument to utilizing such tech-
nologies is that they are brittle. They 'may be
good for routine situations that the designer
has anticipated, but they also fail in unantic-
ipated situations. Such a line of argument
continues by suggesting that we keep users
"in the loop" by making them do more of the
work and by suggesting that, because they
must therefore stay involved, they will notice
and deal with unusual situations. In short,
this argument suggests that although people
won't always find the best solution, by keep-
ing them involved bad solutions are avoided.
Clearly, the extreme form of this argument is
a "straw man." People make errors, too. Con-
sequently, the trade-offs must be weighed be-
tween the potential errors made by the de-
signer (including those for situations that are
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not known,becauseotherwisethe designer
could designfor them!)anderrorsmadeby
users.Also,designsmust assume that both
designers and users are fallible.
Case 3 illustrated the fact that keeping the
person in the loop does not ensure that poor
solutions will be avoided: One of the sketch-
ing-only subjects generated and selected the
poor eastern route on his own. Thus a princi-
ple such as "avoid excessive automation in
order to keep the person involved in the task"
is too simplistic. Keeping the person involved
does not ensure more exploration, nor does it
ensure that solutions will be chosen that are
at least satisfactory. Instead, how specific
ty-pes of designs will interact with users' cog-
nitive processes in specific types of scenarios
to produce undesirable behaviors must be
considered. (The discussions of results for
Cases 1 and 3 provide pertinent illustrations.)
In terms of this application area, what is
needed is a design that lets the computer use
its power to help search the solution space
while keeping the person involved and while
protecting against errors the person may
make. The first two problems might be ad-
dressed by developing sophisticated percep-
tual displays that make alternatives easier to
generate and evaluate. (One possibility would
be a display that allowed the user to prune
undesirable jet route segments by" setting
constraints, for example, telling the com-
puter to hide or dim all jet routes on the map
that pass through more than light turbu-
lence.) Another solution might be using opti-
mization or expert systems technologies to let
the computer generate alternatives (which is
what the Flight-Planning Test Bed does using
the route constraints tool) but improving the
design by having the computer generate the
best alternative(s) for each class of solutions
and then letting the user evaluate these alter-
natives. Thus the computer might display the
"best" deviations both north and south of a
storm for comparison by the user. We specu-
late that both of these potential solutions
would keep users involved because they
would have to look at the data to make
choices among alternatives.
A solution to the third problem (protecting
against the user's errors) is more compli-
cated, though, because the nature of the er-
rors the person might make must first be pre-
dicted.
Overreliance
As pointed out earlier, system users some-
times develop poor plans even when they are
kept in the loop. (Case 3 illustrated this be-
havior.) However, because of the limitations
of the technology used in the Flight-Planning
Test Bed, the route constraints function also
produced a poor suggestion in Case 3. (This
resulted from the fact that the Flight-
Planning Test Bed does not reason about the
uncertainty associated with forecasts.) Our
study illustrated that even though subjects in
the automatic suggestion version used the
available "manual" functions to explore al-
ternatives to the computer's suggestion, 40%
still wound up accepting this poor plan.
Based on this result, it is worth emphasizing
that the effects of providing automatic sug-
gestions by the computer can be quite pro-
nounced. Subjects in Cases 1 and 3 who were
presented with the computer's suggestion
clearly reasoned less (or not at all) about the
uncertainty associated with the forecast,
leading them to accept a poor flight plan in
Case 3. Also, labels such as overreliance are
too shallow as descriptions or explanations of
user performance to adequately guide design
decisions. The design of the computer influ-
ences users in a complex, scenario-specific
fashion. (The discussions of the results for
Cases 1 and 3 present illustrations of such el-'
fects.) Thus, to evaluate proposed support
tools, scenario-sensitive cognitive models
need to be considered.
This failure by subjects to reason about un-
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certaintywhenviewingthecomputer'ssug-
gestionmightbealleviatedbv eitherof the
two solutionsoutlinedearlier.Althoughthe
sketching-onlyversioninducedsubjectsto
lookat critical dataandquestionwhichpath
is better if the forecastis X_Tong,requiring
themto choosefromamongseveralalterna-
tivessuggestedby the computermight in-
ducethemto lookat thecritical dataandask
thesamequestion.
A further formof protectionagainstsuch
failuresto consideruncertaint3"wouldbethe
incorporationofan intelligentalerting func-
tion that eitherwarnedthe personwhena
routemightbetoocloseto adevelopingprob-
lem or inhibitedthe displayof a suggested
routeby thecomputerif it appearedtobetoo
closeto a developingproblem(thusmaking
the computerconservativein suggestingal-
ternatives).Onecautionis in orderregarding
thesepotentialsolutions,however.Subjects
mayfixateon thesetof alternativesolutions
suggestedby thecomputerandconsequently
fail to noteanevenbetter solution that the
computermissed,or fail to notethat thecom-
puterhassuggestedapoor solution.
Maladaptive Strategies
The literature on human problem solving
provides numerous examples of how people
apply simplifying heuristics in order to re-
duce the complexity of a decision (Elstein,
Shulman, and Spraika, 1978; Fraser, Smith,
and Smith, 1992). One such strategy is to
eliminate an alternative based on a single cri-
terion, rather than evaluate the alternative
more globally (in terms of trade-offs among
all of the relevant criteria). In Case 3 this type
of strategy was exhibited by subjects' using
all three versions of the system. The result
was the selection of a poor plan by 10% of the
subjects in the sketching-only version, 30% of
the subjects in the sketching and route con-
straints version, and 40% of the subjects in
the automatic version.
Having the computer indicate several
possible solutions might help to encourage a
more global evaluation. In addition, it might
be helpful to use animation to create displays
to help the user view the data over the entire
flight and to include redundancy in the eval-
uation of plans (e.g., letting the flight crew
look at displays of paths proposed by a dis-
patcher, or vice versa).
Supporting Individual Differences
Results such as those in Case 4 provide
strong evidence for the need to give people
the option to explore alternatives on their
own. Because people differ in terms of their
preferences and mental models of a situation
and because there is no objective way to say
who is right for each situation, designers need
to give people the tools necessary to allow
them to create their own alternatives and to
play "what if" games, even if the computer
provides some suggestions.
Final Note
This study demonstrates that the design of
an effective cooperative system for a complex
task such as flight planning is a significant
challenge. It requires careful consideration of
how system design features and specific dis-
plays influence the cognitive processes of us-
ers in specific types of scenarios. In general,
the results highlight considerations for de-
signers of cooperative problem-solving sys-
tems, particularly those that support dis-
patchers and flight crews.
Are such considerations worth the effort?
The ability of a system design to induce 40%
of the pilots studied to select a poor flight
plan suggests that there is indeed a real need
to explore these issues further and to take
them seriously when implementing commer-
cial systems.
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